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Abstract
Background: Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global issue. International trade, travel, agricultural practices, and
environmental contamination all make it possible for resistant microbes to cross national borders. Global collective
action is needed in the form of an international agreement or other mechanism that brings states together at the
negotiation table and commits them to adopt or implement policies to limit the spread of resistant microorganisms.
This article describes an approach to assessing whether political and stakeholder interests can align to commit to
tackling AMR.
Methods: Two dimensions affecting political feasibility were selected and compared across 82 countries: 1) states’
global influence and 2) self-interest in addressing AMR. World Bank GDP ranking was used as a proxy for global
influence, while human antibiotic consumption (10-year percent change) was used as a proxy for self-interest in
addressing AMR. We used these data to outline a typology of four country archetypes, and discuss how these
archetypes can be used to understand whether a proposed agreement may have sufficient support to be politically
feasible.
Results: Four types of countries exist within our proposed typology: 1) wealthy countries who have the expertise and
financial resources to push for global collective action on AMR, 2) wealthy countries who need to act on AMR, 3)
countries who require external assistance to act on AMR, and 4) neutral countries who may support action where
applicable. Any international agreement will require substantial support from countries of the first type to lead global
action, and from countries of the second type who have large increasing antimicrobial consumption levels. A
large number of barriers exist that could derail efforts towards global collective action on AMR; issues of capacity,
infrastructure, regulation, and stakeholder interests will need to be addressed in coordination with other actors to
achieve an agreement on AMR.
Conclusions: Achieving a global agreement on access, conservation, and innovation – the three pillars of AMR – will
not be easy. However, smaller core groups of interested Initiator and Pivotal Countries could develop policy and
resolve many issues. If highly influential countries take the lead, agreements could then be scaled up to achieve
global action.
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Background
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) occurs when microor-
ganisms such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites
evolve to become resistant to antimicrobial medicines
[1, 2]. International travel, trade, agricultural practices,
and environmental contamination make it easy for re-
sistant microbes to cross national borders [3]. Today, ap-
proximately 700,000 people worldwide die each year
from AMR infections [4].
Antibiotic resistance has consequences for health, eco-
nomics and society. One estimate predicts that AMR
will cause 10 million annual deaths and $100 trillion in
cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) loss by the
year 2050 [4]. Surveillance data suggests that there are
very high rates of antimicrobial resistance throughout all
WHO regions [5]. Many organisms have developed re-
sistance, and the effects are widely felt. For example,
bacteria, such as methicillin resistance staphylococcus
aureus and Klebsiella pneumonia are associated with
high levels of resistance in hospitals, while the sexually
transmitted infection Neisseria gonorrhoea is associated
with resistance in the community. A key concern for
many countries will be the rise of resistance to drugs for
Tuberculosis, Malaria and HIV [5]. Thus, AMR is a glo-
bal issue that requires swift global collective action to
prevent a post-antimicrobial era [1, 3]. A comprehensive
solution to AMR must address three interrelated con-
cerns at the global level: 1) access; 2) conservation; and
3) innovation [6]. Inappropriate and excessive use of an-
timicrobials accelerates the development of AMR [7]. A
lack of innovation means that stores of effective antimi-
crobials are depleting [1]. Meanwhile, millions of people
die each year because they cannot access effective drugs
for antimicrobial-susceptible infections [8].
Ultimately, achieving global collective action through
an international agreement or other mechanism requires
states to come together at the negotiation table and
commit to adopting and implementing decided policies
[9]. Momentum for international action has been building
on this front since the publication of the WHO Global
Strategy for Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance in
2001 [10]. Antimicrobial resistance has been discussed
several times at the World Health Assembly [9, 11–13] in
the intervening years and in 2015 the WHO published
a Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance [14].
Academics have called for global action on antimicrobial
resistance many times in the recent years [6, 7, 15–18],
and several financing initiatives have been launched to im-
prove innovation of new antimicrobials (see Ardal 2016
for a summary [19].) Most recently, antimicrobial resist-
ance was discussed at a High Level Meeting of the United
Nations General Assembly in September 2016 [20].
Economic and budgetary realities, health systems cap-
acities and resources, and competing national priorities
can either constrain or empower governments to act on
global issues such as AMR [21]. While an international
agreement could initiate the necessary global collective
action on AMR [6, 17], states are unlikely to support or
implement such an agreement unless its provisions
benefit domestic and stakeholder interests as well as
international priorities [22, 23]. To be politically feasible,
states and stakeholders must perceive that the benefits of
any agreement outweigh the costs and potential harms.
This article describes an approach we developed for
assessing the political feasibility of achieving global col-
lective action and bringing states together to craft an
international agreement on AMR. We define political
feasibility in this context as the likelihood that political
and stakeholder interests can align to allow nations to
agree to and implement policies addressing antimicrobial
access, conservation, and innovation. The described ap-
proach allows interested parties to understand whether a
proposed international agreement may have sufficient
support from key actors to be politically feasible.
Methods
To analyze political feasibility, we must predict how a
country will act in the face of different proposed inter-
national agreements and in accordance with its internal
political and economic considerations. To this end we
first created a typology that describes four archetypes of
state actors and allows us to hypothesize whether an
international agreement might be feasible based on the
participation of interested states. To complement this
analysis, we identified key barriers to early stage policy-
making that might derail a global agreement on AMR. A
more detailed description of methods and results is
available in the Full Report/Additional file 1.
Comparative political analysis
Two dimensions affecting political feasibility were se-
lected and compared across 82 countries: 1) states’ glo-
bal influence and 2) self-interest in addressing AMR.
Since these dimensions are difficult to measure directly,
proxy measures were selected that balanced the need to
maximize correlation with the primary construct and
availability of data for as many countries as possible.
GDP ranking was chosen to proxy for global influence,
as economic power is often the key determinant of glo-
bal importance. States with financial resources are able
to purchase favour, finance global initiatives, and attract
support. The World Bank makes available annual GDP
data for 214 economies [24].
Changes in human antibiotic consumption was chosen
to proxy for self-interest in addressing AMR. Ideally we
would have used national AMR rates, but unfortunately
there is very little comparable national data available,
particularly for Low and Middle Income Countries (LMIC).
Rogers Van Katwyk et al. Global Health Research and Policy  (2016) 1:20 Page 2 of 10
Instead, we used 10-year percent change in human anti-
biotic use. This is a dynamic measure that allows us to ac-
count for trends in consumption and behaviour changes,
while limiting the potential to be misled by short-term
health and market shocks. Such a 10-year percent change
in antimicrobial consumption gives a long-term overview
of antimicrobial importance at the national level. We
interpreted this measure as an indicator of action or in-
action on AMR, which we assume is correlated with
states’ self-interest in addressing AMR. Whether the
country had high or low consumption rates in 2000, a
large proportional increase in consumption signals a need
to re-examine national priorities, while a decrease suggests
successful stewardship efforts.
Data was available to plot GDP ranking against 10-year
percent change in human antibiotic consumption for 82
countries.
Data sources and data treatment
GDP data was obtained from the World Bank’s 2014 GDP
rankings [24]. Data for 10-year percent change in human
antibiotic consumption was obtained from the Center for
Disease Dynamics, Economics & Policy (CDDEP) and was
collected for the period from 2000 to 2010. This CDDEP
data comprises information collected in the IMS Health
MIDAS database, which uses antibiotics sold in retail and
hospital pharmacies to estimate antibiotic consumption.
Details on the methods of CDDEP can be found elsewhere
[25]. Individual data was available for 66 countries, while
data for 6 countries in Central America and 10 countries
in French West Africa were reported as a group using re-
gional estimates of antibiotic consumption. We chose to
include these countries individually on the chart. Each
country was plotted according to their individual GDP
ranking, and their regional antibiotic consumption level.
We collapsed countries into six ordered categories based
on their level of increase or decrease in antibiotic use. The
categories were: 50% + increase; 30–50% increase; 10–29%
increase; neutral (less than 10% increase/decrease), 10–
29% decrease, and 50% + decrease.
Inverse GDP ranking was plotted on a Cartesian graph
such that the top-right corner of the graph theoretically
contains countries with high influence and high self-
interest in addressing AMR. Thresholds were chosen to
delineate the four typology archetypes; for GDP, the most
highly influential countries were designated as those within
the wealthiest quartile globally; for change in antibiotic
consumption countries were divided into two groups ac-
cording to whether there had been an increase or decrease
in antibiotic consumption over the 10-year span.
Scoping review of barriers to action
A review of published and grey literature was conducted
to identify and summarize barriers to early action on
AMR. We initially identified key stakeholder groups, and
tensions between these groups on AMR related issues
(Additional file 1). Our identified barriers to early action
on AMR were first classified according to the first four
stages of the policy making cycle (agenda setting, agree-
ment formulation, legitimation, and implementation) to
show how early they would need to be addressed. Next,
barriers were connected to any of the five relevant stake-
holder groups: national governments, international orga-
nizations, civil-society organizations, the agricultural
industry, and the pharmaceutical industry. In making
these connections we identified relevant collaborators
for action and gained insight into the choices a rational
country might make given how AMR regulations would
impact major industries and other stakeholders.
Results
Typology
We developed a four category typology of involvement
in AMR based on data from 82 countries. In Fig. 1, we
compared proxy measures for states’ global influence
and self interest in addressing AMR across 82 countries
and, based on the chart, developed four state archetypes
which are overlaid on Fig. 1.
Based on this data we describe four simplified archetypes
of countries (Fig. 2): 1) Initiator Countries, 2) Pivotal Coun-
tries, 3) Follower Countries, and 4) Neutral Countries.
Initiator Countries are both highly influential and saw
substantial net decreases in human antibiotic consumption
between 2000 and 2010. We theorize that these countries
could be influential in initiating global action on AMR.
Their success in decreasing antibiotic use makes these
countries a potential source of expert knowledge on redu-
cing antimicrobial use and AMR. Further, these countries
are most likely to have the resources and capacity to facili-
tate sustained action on AMR.
Pivotal Countries are also highly influential with total
GDPs falling within the top 25% globally. But these coun-
tries also saw some of the largest net increases in human
antibiotic consumption between 2000 and 2010. Whether a
particular Pivotal Country is likely to engage in coordinated
global action on AMR depends on the internal context and
dynamics within that country. However, the position of Piv-
otal Countries on the global influence scale suggests they
could influence other countries’ positions and actions, and
that Pivotal Countries ought to be involved in discussions
on AMR. Further, the rising use of antibiotics in Pivotal
Countries suggests a need to re-examine their policies on
antimicrobial use. Examples of Pivotal Countries include all
of the BRICS countries (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand.
Follower Countries are less influential at the global
level and saw net increases in human antibiotic consump-
tion between 2000 and 2010. Countries in this group face
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Fig. 1 Global influence (GDP ranking) against self-interest in addressing AMR (10-year percent change in human antibiotic consumption). Four
typology categories (Pivotal, Initiator, Follower and Neutral) representing different roles in addressing AMR are overlaid
Fig. 2 Description of typology categories
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a broad range of challenges, from basic surveillance and
sanitation to the implementation of national action plans.
Competing priorities mean that Follower Countries are
not naturally disposed to support or commit resources to
an AMR agreement. Nevertheless, countries who lack the
resources to act independently on AMR may be incentiv-
ized to participate through collaboration with others and
resource assistance. Potential resistance to action from
Follower Countries is less of an immediate concern for es-
tablishing global AMR policies, because these countries
are unlikely to dissuade other countries from participating.
Neutral Countries are less influential at the global
level, and saw net decreases in human antibiotic con-
sumption between 2000 and 2010. These countries
might also be a source of expert knowledge, and might
already be predisposed to participate in an AMR agree-
ment. Countries in this group present the lowest risk if
not initially included in an AMR agreement, because
their antibiotic usage has decreased recently and few are
major economic players.
Barriers to AMR action
We identified several barriers to collective action on AMR
that must be considered when crafting an international
agreement (Table 1 or refer to Additional file 1 for more
detail). A strong commitment to AMR is necessary from
the outset, as competing health priorities may pose a bar-
rier to keeping AMR front and central on the policy
agenda (Table 1). Naturally, short-term emergencies will
push long-term health threats to the background; political
turmoil and other disease threats both compete with
AMR for attention from policy makers [26]. There is also
an ongoing lack of comprehensive data that creates uncer-
tainty as to the scope of the AMR problem in most coun-
tries [5, 26, 27]. Establishing the scope of this problem will
be key, yet many countries lack the infrastructure to carry
out surveillance of either antimicrobial consumption or
antimicrobial resistance. Further, international discord on
surveillance practices makes producing reliable AMR data
even more difficult [5]. Uncertainty as to what constitutes
therapeutic or nontherapeutic antimicrobial use in live-
stock makes it difficult to assess the extent to which these
practices exist in agriculture [28]. To measure the magni-
tude and scope of the problem, countries need adequate
surveillance of AMR in humans, animals, and of antibiotic
sales and prescribing practices [5].
A lack of data may also hinder AMR policy formula-
tion (Table 1) [28]. To date, there have been insufficient
efforts to evaluate the impact of existing AMR control
policies, which creates a practical challenge to crafting
and estimating the effect of new policies. Larger-scale
evaluations or comparative effectiveness studies (e.g., for
best farming practices) [29] would help determine the
most effective provisions to include in an international
agreement. Many of the evaluations that currently exist
are single hospital interventions, which are typically ana-
lyzed only for economic impact at the hospital level [30].
The need to secure funding from external donors may
also constrain policy formulation (Table 1). Where other
nations or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) place condi-
tions on grants, policies may shift to meet those condi-
tions. Reconciling key stakeholder mandates, business
models, interests, and perceptions presents a further chal-
lenge. Policy makers may face strong opposition when
highly organized industries expect to bear the highest
cost of a policy [22]. For example, the agricultural industry
will not likely support an international AMR agreement
targeting agricultural use of antibiotics unless other cost-
effective alternatives are found [29]. Likewise, pharmaceut-
ical innovators are unlikely to support an international
AMR agreement without incentives to invest in research
and development (R&D).
Additionally, reconciling complex international regula-
tory standards in a way that encourages stakeholders to
participate may be challenging. For example, the typically
complicated and expensive regulatory requirements for
developing new antimicrobials currently act as a deterrent
to innovation [31].
Garnering legal support for an international AMR
agreement presents further challenges (Table 1). A le-
gally binding and enforceable agreement could ensure
certain AMR policies are adopted and implemented on a
global scale [16]. However, few entities have the author-
ity and capacity to enact binding rules on a potentially
global scale. International law can also be difficult to en-
force. For example, countries can ratify legally binding
agreements while opting-out of particular commitments
or submitting reservations [32]. Addressing AMR at a glo-
bal level will require mechanisms for achieving widespread
implementation, compliance, and accountability [18].
Fragmentation of existing AMR efforts may also create
barriers to policy legitimation. Some transnational entities
have proposed norms and standards to respond to AMR
and any new agreement will likely face challenges in har-
monizing existing efforts and frameworks while addressing
national and regional participation and needs [33].
To implement an international AMR agreement (Table 1),
actors and stakeholders will need to continue to cooperate
at national and international levels. As with policy formula-
tion, the challenge will be to reconcile stakeholder interests
as well as international regulatory standards in a manner
that permits sustainable commitment to AMR policy. Simi-
larly, countries may face challenges reconciling domestic
powers to implement international standards, particularly
in federal countries where powers over health are divided
with domestic states or provinces [34, 35]. Successful
implementation will also require enforcement and ac-
countability mechanisms [18].
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Weak infrastructure and capacity in research, surveil-
lance, manufacturing, sanitation, and infection control
may also hinder policy implementation. For example, re-
search infrastructure is lacking for antimicrobial R&D
due to poor financial incentives and past perceptions
that research was no longer needed in this field [31].
Further, many countries lack the capacity to enforce laws
against counterfeit pharmaceuticals [36]. At the most
Table 1 Barriers to Global Action on AMR by Policy Stage
Policy Stage Barrier Associated Stakeholders
Agenda Setting Lack of Data National Governments
Supranational Organizations
Civil Society Organizations
Agricultural Industry
Pharmaceutical Industry
Achieving Public Engagement National Governments
Civil Society Organizations
Competing Health Priorities National Governments
Pharmaceutical Industry
Agreement Formulation Unknown Impact of AMR Control Policies National Governments
Supranational Organizations
Civil Society Organizations
Agricultural Industry
Pharmaceutical Industry
Reconciling Mandates, Business Models, and Perspectives of Key Stakeholders National Governments
Supranational Organizations
Cost Distribution & Funding National Governments
Supranational Organizations
Pharmaceutical Industry
Agreement Legitimation Lack of Enforcement of International Law National Governments
Supranational Organizations
Civil Society Organizations
Agricultural Industry
Pharmaceutical Industry
Enacting Binding Rules on a Global Scale National Governments
Supranational Organizations
Fragmentation of Global Health Governance and Initiatives Supranational Organizations
Agreement Implementation Unregulated Distribution of Antimicrobials (legal and counterfeit) National Governments
Civil Society Organizations
Pharmaceutical Industry
Lack of Capacity and Infrastructure National Governments
Civil Society Organizations
Agricultural Industry
Pharmaceutical Industry
Reconciling Domestic Political Powers National Governments
Coordinating Actors National Governments
Supranational Organizations
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basic level, sanitation and infection control remain a
problem in many places, and antibiotics are used as a
stopgap to ensure patient safety [27].
Discussion
Principal findings
We found that countries can be grouped into four ar-
chetypes, each with a different role to play in global
action on AMR based on their global influence and
self-interest in AMR. Figure 3 shows the areas where
each type of country can be meaningfully engaged in
action on AMR. Initiator and Pivotal Countries can take
useful action in the most areas due to their wealth and
capacity, their relationship with pharmaceutical industries,
and their ability to provide foreign aid to countries with
less capacity.
A large number of barriers must be resolved to achieve
global collective action on AMR. For this reason, we
project that a single broad global agreement that addresses
all three areas of AMR action (i.e., access, conservation,
and innovation) will not be easy to achieve. Many coun-
tries face a lack of resources and capacity, and a large
number of competing domestic priorities. In these places,
it would be difficult to even get AMR on the political
agenda, much less the resources necessary to implement
AMR policies. In wealthier countries there are numerous
stakeholder perspectives that must be considered, and sev-
eral other global actors to be engaged to support action.
However, despite these challenges, we believe that there
are mechanisms to engage the support of core-groups of
countries in AMR action, which could be scaled up to
achieve broad ranging global action.
Policy implications
Based on our typology, we need not engage all countries in
order to lay the groundwork for an agreement, particularly
for more targeted agreements. Two groups, Initiator and
Pivotal Countries, need to lead action on AMR. These
countries have significant financial resources to contribute
to capacity building in poorer countries, and many rank
among the largest users of antimicrobials in both humans
and animals [27].
The most politically feasible option in our view is to
leverage smaller groups of specialized Initiator and Piv-
otal Countries to drive agreement, particularly in the
early stages of agenda setting and policy development.
Recognizing that eventually it will be necessary to attract
participation from many nations and to widely imple-
ment policies, we believe that some agreements may be
best served by resolving differences among a small group
of countries with similar interests and priorities. For ex-
ample, conservation in agriculture could be first addressed
Fig. 3 Roles of different types of countries in addressing AMR access, conservation and innovation. Pictograms from The Noun Project, created by
Egor Culcea, Icon 54, and Korawan. M
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among countries with the largest agricultural export sec-
tors. Having achieved a measure of consensus among this
group, the agreement could then be modified to meet the
needs of additional countries. Many Follower Countries will
need to build substantial capacity before they are capable of
participating in an agreement. These capacities include la-
boratory capacity for implementing surveillance and testing
measures including human resources, and improvements
to regulatory measures, and enforcement. We encourage
the participation of Follower Countries in discussions to
build international agreement, and encourage their eventual
integration into a proposed agreement. We suggest that
Follower Countries be engaged as observers of the process,
giving them the ability to participate in policy discussions
while building the capacity for implementation. Follower
countries would gain flexibility through this process, as they
would not be subject to immediate financial or resource
commitments, and could work alongside other nations to-
wards a gradual integration into an agreement.
Several strategies are available to increase participation
in an agreement. Broader coordinated action can be in-
creased using incentives and trade-offs to gain agreement
from countries outside the core group of leading coun-
tries. For example, Pivotal Countries with an emerging
pharmaceutical market could be engaged to support ac-
cess to affordable antimicrobials in resource-poor regions
in exchange for contributing to a global pool for funding
innovation. This type of measure would alleviate the finan-
cial burden placed on Initiator Countries who are driving
innovation, and thereby facilitate access in lower-income
countries—even if they are not part of an initial AMR
agreement. Alternatively, lower-income Pivotal Countries
could be offered access to research funding and new in-
novations in exchange for adopting and implementing
conservation policies, which could facilitate agreement
on innovation and conservation [16]. Relying on certain
Initiator and Pivotal Countries to initiate a global solution
to AMR places some pressure on those countries from a
resource perspective. However, the potential benefits of
taking the lead outweigh the costs. Because AMR is a
global issue, each country stands to benefit when other
countries take action. If high-influence countries can
initiate global AMR policies, Follower and Neutral
Countries will be easier to attract. Each country has
traditionally been responsible for its own domestic policies
on a variety of health issues, but given the cross-border,
global nature of AMR, the onus has now become a col-
lective one. To enact sustainable solutions on a global
scale, countries with the highest level of influence must
take the lead and advocate for united global action.
There is also a role for non-governmental stakeholders
in this phased-in approach to an international agree-
ment. Supranational organizations, for example, can
offer a platform for discussions where countries can
come together to develop an agreement along issue spe-
cific regional lines. Civil society organizations can pro-
vide expertise and support, particularly for the
recruitment of Follower Countries into an agreement.
GARP, the Global Antibiotic Resistance Partnership, is
already acting in this capacity, bringing financing from
civil society organizations together with national gov-
ernments to improve capacity for responding to anti-
microbial resistance [37].
Strengths and weaknesses
Our typology provides an organizing structure that as-
sists in discussing the similarities of groups of countries.
We have taken a comprehensive approach to deriving
our classification system; the typology is transparent and
has been developed based on data, rather than precon-
ceived stereotypes of countries. In using data from 82
countries, we have sacrificed some nuance, particularly
in describing countries that fall on the borderlines of
our categories. We recognize that there are a number of
reasons why some countries sit on the neutral line with no
major variation in antibiotic consumption over 10 years;
some may have acted to curb their antibiotic consumption
before 2000 and others may have taken no action at all.
These countries should be analyzed on a case-by-case
basis to determine which type classification is most appro-
priate. We also recognize that, in the long term, countries
will not remain in the same category that they currently
occupy in Table 1. Our antibiotic consumption data was
from 2000 to 2010; as data becomes available for more
recent years, countries that substantially increase or
decrease their antibiotic consumption should be re-
evaluated accordingly.
We were unable to obtain data for this project on agri-
cultural use of antibiotics due to a global lack of data on
this topic. Agricultural use of antimicrobial agents is a
contentious issue for many countries with strong agricul-
tural industries and policies to limit use in animals would
undoubtedly influence the way such countries participate
in AMR agreement. We recognize this is a shortcoming of
our categorization system. Globally it is necessary to im-
prove reporting on antibiotic consumption in agriculture,
and to develop a measurement system that allows for
comparison across animal species.
Future research directions
Currently, there are few proposals that suggest concrete
steps for global action on AMR. As new proposals are
developed, they should take into account the archetypes
described here to determine whether they have support
from relevant Initiator and Pivotal Countries. Additionally,
further research is needed to find strategies for addressing
many of the barriers we have identified. Improvements in
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capacity, surveillance, and regulation will go a long way to-
wards making global collective action more feasible.
Conclusions
Achieving a global agreement on access, conservation,
and innovation will not be easy – as we have shown
there are several barriers that must be overcome. How-
ever, smaller core groups of interested Initiator and Piv-
otal Countries could develop AMR policies and resolve
many of these barriers. If highly influential countries
take the lead, agreements could then be scaled up to
achieve global action.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Detailed description of methods and results is
available in the Full Report/Web 117 Appendix. (PDF 8194 kb)
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